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JONATHAN L. HOWELL*
Before the late 1970s, little effort was made to adopt a unified mechanism for dealing with
international insolvency. Ultimately, however, the increase in corporate globalization and
international insolvencies led to the enactment of Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
(the "Code") in 1978. While Section 304 allowed U.S. courts to recognize foreign represent-
atives and foreign proceedings, the statute gave U.S. courts great discretion and, thus, created
inconsistent jurisprudence. Finally, in 2005, Congress adopted Chapter 15 of the Code, based
on the Model Law of International Insolvency, to replace Section 304. Part I of this paper
discusses various theoretical principles relating to international insolvencies. Part II examines
former Section 304 of the Code and its inconsistent jurisprudence. Part III analyzes the
development of a unified insolvency doctrine, the Model Law, and the European Insolvency
Regulation. And finally, part IV explores the recently enacted Chapter 15 and its probable
impact on international insolvencies.
From the time insolvency law emerged in the fourteenth century until the late 1970s,
little effort was made to adopt a unified mechanism for dealing with international insol-
vency., Although the International Bar Association, the World Bank, and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) all proposed unified insolvency mechanisms, most
governments chose not to adopt them due to fear that foreign courts would treat domestic
debtors unfairly.2 As a result, when a multinational debtor commenced an insolvency pro-
ceeding, the event triggered three difficult issues: (1) whether a foreign representative
could act in a domestic bankruptcy proceeding; (2) whether the domestic court should
recognize foreign ancillary proceedings; and (3) if the domestic court should recognize
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foreign ancillary proceedings, whether the domestic court should give deference to con-
flicting foreign law.3
In 1978, the increase in corporate globalization and international insolvencies led to the
enactment of Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"). 4 While Section 304
allowed U.S. courts to recognize foreign representatives and foreign proceedings,5 the
statute gave U.S. courts great discretion in determining whether local creditors were sub-
ject to, or shielded from, the proceedings and laws of the foreign court.6 Because Section
304 gave U.S. courts great discretion, the courts' application of the statute created incon-
sistent jurisprudence. 7
In 2005, Congress adopted Chapter 15 of the Code to replace Section 304.8 Based on
the Model Law of Cross-Border Insolvency (the "Model Law"), Chapter 15 furthers the
effort to unify international insolvency law by requiring U.S. courts to communicate and
cooperate with foreign insolvency courts to avoid unnecessary adjudication and applica-
tion of foreign law.9
Part I of this paper discusses various theoretical principles relating to international in-
solvencies. Part II examines former Section 304 of the Code and its inconsistent jurispru-
dence. Part III analyzes the development of a unified insolvency doctrine, the Model
Law, and the European Insolvency Regulation. And finally, part IV explores the recently
enacted Chapter 15 and its probable impact on international insolvencies.
I. International Insolvency Theories: Territorialism and Universalism
International insolvency has taken two varying theoretical approaches throughout its
history: territorialism and universalism. 10 The understanding of these theories will give
the reader a firm foundation for grasping the current issues surrounding international
insolvency. This part of the paper will therefore discuss the meaning, advantages and
disadvantages, and the pre-Bankruptcy Code cases of both ideologies.
A. TERR1TORIALISM
1. Meaning
The theory of territorialism centers upon national sovereignty and the belief that a
court's power is limited to its country's jurisdiction and insolvency law." Under this ap-
proach, a U.S. court presiding over a multinational debtor's reorganization would deal
3. See Jennifer Greene, Bankruptcy Beyond Borders: Recognizing Foreign Proceedings in Cross-Border Insolven-
cies, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 685, 685 (2005).
4. Lesley Salafia, Cross-Border Insolvency Law in the United States & Its Application to Multinational Corporate
Groups, 21 CONN. J. INT'L L. 297, 297-98 (2006).
5. Id. at 298.
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2005), amended by 11 U.S.C. §§ 1500, etseq. (2005).
7. Greene, supra note 3, at 699.
8. Biery, supra note 1 at 24.
9. Id. at 51-52.
10. CHARLEs D. BOOTH, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies in a Transnational Setting: An Analysis of the Laws
of the United States in 2 THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUsINESs TRANSACTIONS § 9:2 (Ved P. Nanda ed.,
2003).
11. Salafia, supra note 4, at 299; id.
VOL. 42, NO. 1
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW 115
only with U.S. bankruptcy law, U.S. assets, and U.S. creditors.12 Likewise, a Mexican
court, contemporaneously hearing the same multinational debtor's reorganization, would
deal only with Mexican insolvency law, Mexican assets, and Mexican creditors.' 3
2. Advantages and Disadvantages
The theory of territorialism has both its advantages and disadvantages. 14 The territorial
approach allows a domestic court to shield local creditors from biased foreign courts and
suspect foreign law.' 5 Simultaneously, domestic courts can ensure that local creditors
have a fair opportunity to receive a portion of the multinational debtor's assets located in
the United States. 16
On the other hand, territorialism has several disadvantages.'7 For example, when ap-
plying a territorial approach, courts require multinational debtors to reorganize piecemeal
under conflicting laws of several countries.' 8 And, because territorialism requires a mul-
tinational debtor to commence separate insolvency proceedings in each country, it creates
increased costs to both the debtor and the debtor's multinational creditors.' 9 Further,
individual countries suffer from increased judicial expenses as a result of duplicative insol-
vency proceedings. 20 In sum, a court's decision to adopt a territorial approach, while satis-
fying the interests of local creditors, 'will be overly burdensome for the debtor and




Unlike territorialism, the theory of universalism hinges upon the cooperation among all
countries affected by the administration of a multinational debtor's estate.2 2 Under this
theory, in countries where the debtor has assets, all foreign courts apply the procedural
and substantive law of the country hosting the main insolvency proceeding.2 3 A trustee
will then seek turnover of the debtor's assets worldwide to the main proceeding.2 4 There-
after, creditors submit their claims to the main proceeding, and "the final adjudication is
to be respected by all other nations." 25 Applying universalism to the previous hypotheti-
cal, a Mexican court would apply U.S. bankruptcy law and later turn over the multina-
12. See BonH, supra note 10; see also John A. E. Pottow, Greed & Pride in International Bankruptcy: The
Problems of& Proposed Solutions to "Local Interests," 104 MIcH. L. REv. 1899, 1904 (2006).
13. See Boorn-i, supra note 10.
14. See Biery, supra note 1, at 25-32.
15. See id.
16. Pottow, supra note 12, at 1900.
17. See Biery, supra note 1, at 25-32.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. BOOTH, supra note 10.
21. Id.; Biery, supra note 1, at 25-32.
22. Biery, supra note 1, at 29.
23. Id.
24. BOOTH, supra note 10.
25. Id.
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tional debtor's Mexican assets to the U.S. trustee. 26 Once the U.S. court has decided what
share of the proceeds the Mexican creditors will receive, the Mexican court must respect
this decision. 27
2. Advantages and Disadvantages
Like territorialism, universalism has advantages and disadvantages. 2s Advantages of
universalism include equal sharing of proceeds among creditors, increased proceeds by
avoiding unnecessary litigation, and transnational cooperation among courts to attain
greater efficiency and certainty for the international marketplace to avoid dissipation of
assets.29 The disadvantages of universalism include the inconvenience and hardships in-
curred by local creditors as a result of traveling to a foreign proceeding and the unfamili-
arity of foreign law. 30
C. PRE-BANKRUPTcy CODE CASES DEMONSTRATING TERR1TORALISM AND
UNrVERSALISM
1. Territorialism
Early on, U.S. courts took a territorial approach to international insolvency proceed-
ings, as illustrated in Harrison v. Sterry.31 There, a trading company by the name of Rob-
ert Bird & Co. filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States.3 2 To collect the debtor's
assets located in South Carolina, a group of British creditors subsequently filed suit
against the United States and the debtor's U.S. creditors and assignees.3 3 In their peti-
tion, the British creditors argued that they were entitled to the assets because of an assign-
ment interest created by an agreement with the debtor.34 The United States, however,
responded by asserting its own right to these assets, arguing its lien interest had priority
over the lien of their British counterparts.35 At trial, the Circuit Court for the District of
South Carolina found in favor of the United States, and, as a result, the British creditors
appealed.36
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding.37 In deciding that the
United States was entitled to priority of payment over the British creditors, the court
highlighted the fact that the agreement between the debtor and the English creditors was
formed in England and declared that "the bankrupt[cy] law of a foreign country is incapa-
ble of operating a legal transfer of property in the United States." 38
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Id.; Biery, supra note 1, at 25-32.
29. BooTH, supra note 10.
30. Biery, supra note 1 at 29; BooTH, supra note 10.
31. See Harrison v. Stery, 9 U.S. 289 (1809); see also BooTH, supra note 10.
32. Harrison, 9 U.S. at **1.
33. Id.
34. Id. at **9-**10.
35. Id. at 298.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 301.
38. Id. at 302.; see also BooH, supra note 10.
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Another case demonstrating the territorial approach pre-Bankruptcy Code is In re
Waite.39 In that case, a New York firm, Haynes & Sanger made a general assignment after
becoming insolvent for the benefit of its creditors to Charles Waite, who was a member of
the firm of Pendle & Waite, which had offices in both New York and London.40 Later,
Pendle & Waite became insolvent as well, commencing liquidation proceedings in the
London Court of Bankruptcy.41 As part of these proceedings, a trustee was appointed to
collect the assets of the firm in both England and in the United States.42 Notwithstanding
the liquidation proceedings, Waite continued to act as an assignee for Haynes & Singer
and paid himself $14,333 under the preference. 43 Waite then filed a petition in the Court
of Common Pleas of New York City for a settlement of his accounts as assignee.44 The
foreign trustee, Schofield, appeared in the Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the as-
signment should be paid to him.45 The Court of Common Pleas found the law of New
York did not recognize the validity of foreign insolvency proceedings to transfer title to
property,46 and Schofield subsequently appealed.47
The Court of Appeals of New York ruled that Schofield was competent to appear before
the court and was the authorized creditor entitled to payment.48 The court reasoned that
Schofield was the authorized creditor entitled to payment because Waite, who had notice
of the foreign liquidation proceeding, was estopped and had no right to make payment to
himself.49 Specifically, the court held that Schofield was an authorized creditor entitled to
the preferential payment of $14,333 because "no injustice will be done to our own citi-
zens ... by allowing the transfer to have full effect here."50 In other words, the court's
conclusion that Schofield was an authorized creditor was contingent upon the fact that no
U.S. creditors claimed a right to the preferential payment of $14,337.51
2. Universalism
The first case demonstrating a shift in U.S. courts from territorialism to universalism
was Canada Southern Railway v. Gebhard.52 There, a Canadian railroad company filed for
reorganization in Canada.53 New York bondholders then filed suit in the United States to
recover on their bonds.54 But the Supreme Court barred the bondholders' action, ruling
that the bondholders were required to assert their claims in the Canadian insolvency pro-
39. See In re Waite, 99 N.Y. 433 (1885); see also BooTH, supra note 10.
40. In re Waite, 99 N.Y. at 436.
41. Id.
42. Id.




47. Id. at 438.
48. Id. at 451.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 439.
51. See id.; BooTH, supra note 10.
52. See Canada So. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883); see also BooTH, supra note 10.
53. See Canada So. Ry., 109 U.S. 527.
54. See id. at 535-36.
SPRING 2008
118 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
ceedings.55 Although the Court acknowledged that the Canadian laws would change the
bondholders' rights to the debtor's assets, the Court held that the bondholders were
bound by the Canadian insolvency proceedings because a person who deals with a foreign
corporation "impliedly subjects himself to the laws of the foreign government .. 5.. ,56
After Gebhard, the Supreme Court in Hilton v. Goyout continued its push towards uni-
versalism.5 7 In Hilton, the Supreme Court began by promulgating what was then a well-
established principle of territorialism: "No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the
limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law
of one nation ...shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation,
depends upon what our greatest jurists have been content to call 'the comity of na-
tions.' ' 5 .The Court subsequently propounded the now well-known explanation of
comity:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative.. ., and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.5 9
After Hilton, some cases expanded comity and thus expanded the theory of universal-
ism.60 For example, the Court of Appeals for New York in In re Stoddard and Norske Lloyd
Ins. ordered the assets of a foreign insurance company to be turned over to the primary
receiver from Norway despite U.S. creditors' arguments that the court should first satisfy
their claims. 61 Relying on the principle of comity, the court reasoned that there was "[no]
principle of equity, comity, or public policy which authorizes the application of the funds
[for] .. .payment in full of local creditors before transmission of any surplus to the pri-
mary or domiciliary receiver."62
II. Section 304
Furthering the move toward universalism, Congress adopted Section 304 of the Code.63
This part of the paper discusses Section 304's purpose, its language, its advantages and
disadvantages, and its inconsistent jurisprudence.
A. PURPOSE
Section 304 was adopted by Congress in 1978 as part of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code at
the urging of bankruptcy academics and practitioners to "provide a clearer role for the
55. Id. at 539.
56. Id. at 537; see also BOOTH, supra note 10.
57. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); BOoTH, supra note 10.
58. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163.
59. Id. at 163-64; see also BOOTH, supra note 10.
60. See In re Stoddard and In re Norske Lloyd Ins., 242 N.Y. 148 (1926); see also BOOTH, supra note 10.
61. In re Stoddard and In re Norske Lloyd Ins., 242 N.Y. at 168.
62. Id. at 163; see also BOOTH, supra note 10.
63. Salafia, supra note 4, at 297.
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U.S. bankruptcy courts in cross-border insolvencies."64 Section 304's legislative purpose
was to empower U.S. courts in the administration of bankruptcies ancillary to foreign
insolvency proceedings. 65
B. STATUTORY LANGUAGE
Section 304 was broken up into three subsections: (a), (b), and (c). Subsection (a) gave
foreign representatives 66 the authority to file a petition with a U.S. court if that court was
hearing a case ancillary to a foreign proceeding.67 Following the foreign representative's
filing of a petition, subsection (b) provided the court with power to grant the following
forms of relief: (1) enjoin or continue any action against the debtor with respect to prop-
erty involved in a foreign proceeding, (2) enjoin or continue any action against property
involved in a foreign proceeding, (3) enjoin or continue the enforcement of any judgment
against the debtor or a judicial proceeding to create or enforce a lien against the foreign
estate, (4) order turnover of proceeds or property of the foreign estate to the foreign
representative, or (5) order "other appropriate relief."68
Finally, subsection (c) set forth six factors meant to guide the court in deciding which
form of relief "will best assure an economical and expeditious administration of [the for-
eign] estate." 69 The six factors were:
(1) Just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate;
(2) Protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconve-
nience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) Prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate;
(4) Distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the order
prescribed by this title;
(5) Comity; and
(6) If appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the individual
that such foreign proceeding concerns. 70
C. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Congress' enactment of Section 304 brought several advantages. 71 A foreign represen-
tative finally had clear statutory authority, as opposed to judge-made law, allowing him or
64. Paul L. Lee, Ancillary Proceedings under Section 304 and Proposed Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, 76
Am. BANKR. LJ. 115, 115 (2002).
65. Id.
66. A "foreign representative" was defined as a "duly selected trustee, administrator, or other representative
of an estate in a foreign proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (2005).
67. A "foreign proceeding" was defined as any judicial or administrative proceeding, bankruptcy or other-
wise, "in a foreign country in which the debtor's domicile, residence, principal place of business, or principal
assets were located at the commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of liquidating an estate, adjust-





71. See Biery, supra note 1, at 32-33; Salafia, supra note 4, at 297-98.
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her to be heard in an ancillary case. 72 Likewise, the enactment of Section 304 gave U.S.
courts specific statutory guidelines in determining what relief to grant in such cases. 73
But, Section 304 also had serious disadvantages. 74 Most notably, before Section 304's
enactment, many bankruptcy courts were moving toward a more universal approach-that
is, they were already recognizing the right to hear foreign representatives and ordering the




Section 304's lack of clarity allowed bankruptcy courts to create inconsistent jurispru-
dence. Instead of using concrete instructions regarding when bankruptcy courts should
grant a foreign representative relief, Section 304 included a balancing test in subsection
(C).7 7 The balancing test required bankruptcy courts to consider both universal and terri-
torial ideals when deciding whether to grant relief.78 Essentially, the balancing test gave
bankruptcy courts great discretion and support to grant a remedy in line with whatever
theoretical approach they favored (whether universal or territorial). 79 Accordingly, courts
that were reluctant to break with a territorial approach denied relief based on priority
under the Code or based on the prejudice and inconvenience suffered by U.S. creditors by
the foreign court's processing of U.S. claims. 80 Likewise, courts that favored a universal
approach would grant relief and support their decision based on the principles of comity,
the just treatment of all holders of claims, the prevention of preferential or fraudulent
dispositions, and the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the foreign debtor.81
2. Cases
Several cases illustrate the split in jurisprudence between courts that took a territorial
approach and those that took a universal approach following Section 304's enactment. 82
This part of the paper will briefly discuss cases illustrating the courts' inconsistent applica-
tion of section 304.
72. See § 304.
73. See id.
74. Greene, soipra note 3, at 686-87; Salafia, supra note 4, at 298.
75. See In re Toga Mftg., 28 B.R. 165, 170-171 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.1983); In re LineasAreas de Nicaragua, 13
B.R. 779, 780-781 (Bankr. S.D. Fl. 1981).
76. See Greene, supra note 3, at 703-05.
77. Id. at 687.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See § 305(c).
81. See id.
82. Compare In re Toga Mftg., 28 B.R. at 167-168, with Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Srvices AB, 773 F.2d
452, 454-55 (2d Cir. 1985).
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a. Territorial Cases
A case that demonstrates a bankruptcy court's universal application of Section 304 is In
re Toga Mfg. 83 In that case, an American creditor, Peter T. Hesse Enterprises, received an
arbitration award against a Canadian bankruptcy debtor, Toga Manufacturing Limited. 84
Hesse subsequently filed a claim in a Michigan county court to enforce the award. 85 Seek-
ing to resolve the debtor's bankruptcy case in Canada, the foreign trustee filed a petition
under Section 304(a) in the bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of Michigan, re-
questing an order enjoining the state court action and turnover of Toga's U.S. funds. 86
In deciding whether to grant relief, the bankruptcy court first determined that, while
Hesse's claim would not have priority under the Canadian Bankruptcy Act, it would have
priority under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.87 As a result, the court denied the foreign
trustee's petition, concluding that Hesse would receive unequal treatment in the Canadian
bankruptcy proceeding, and, in order to protect Hesse from a foreign judgment inconsis-
tent with American policies, the claim needed to remain within the United States. 88
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida took a territorial
approach when applying Section 304 in In re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua S-4.89 There, the
debtor, a Nicaraguan airline, commenced foreign proceedings in Nicaragua.9° Soon
thereafter, a foreign trustee filed a petition under Section 304(a) with the bankruptcy
court, seeking turnover of the debtor's U.S. assets as well as injunctive relief to stay all
U.S. litigation against the debtor or its property. 9' The bankruptcy court ordered the
turnover. 92 But, the order stipulated that the debtor's assets, totaling $203,000, would be
used to first satisfy U.S. creditors' claims. 93 Because the U.S. creditors' undisputed claims
exceeded the total value of the debtor's U.S. assets, the order was virtually worthless to
non-U.S. creditors. 94 Moreover, the court made turnover contingent upon prohibiting
the foreign trustee from assigning, encumbering, or abandoning the U.S. assets.95 Later,
the court also appointed an independent co-trustee to supervise the debtor's position re-
garding a potential purchase of the debtor's most valuable U.S. asset, its 402 certificate,
which effectively allowed the Nicaraguan debtor to operate in the United States.96
b. Universal Cases
In re Culmer illustrates the courts' universal application of Section 304.97 In that case,
Banco Ambrosiano Overseas Limited (BAOL), a banking company organized under the
83. See In re Toga Mftg., 28 B.R. at 167-168.
84. Id. at 165.
85. Id. at 165-66.
86. Id. at 166-67.
87. Id. at 167-70.
88. Id. at 170; see also Biery, s pra note 1, at 41-42.
89. See In re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua, 13 B.R. at 779.
90. Id. at 779.
91. Id. at 780.
92. Id.
93, Id.
94. Id. at 780-81.
95, Id.
96. Id.
97. See In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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laws of the Bahamas, filed a voluntary wind-up application with the Bahamas Supreme
Court.98 At the time of the filing, BAOL maintained clearing, custodial, and brokerage
accounts at banks and financial institutions located in the Southern District of New York,
despite not doing any business in the United States.99 As such, BAOL filed a Section 304
petition in the Southern District of New York requesting injunctive relief and turnover of
its U.S. assets to the Bahamas for administration in the Bahamian liquidation proceeding
in accordance with Bahamian law.' 00 U.S. creditors, however, opposed BAOL's request,
arguing that their interests should have been determined under U.S. law.1O1 After apply-
ing Section 304(c), the bankruptcy court found that BAOL had met all six factors. 102 Be-
cause the record was devoid of any evidence of prejudice, and because BAOL made sure it
had satisfied all the legal requirements for affording comity, the court granted the foreign
representative's petition. 0
3
Like the court in In re Culmer, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Cunard
Steamship Co. also applied a universal approach to Section 304.104 In that case, Salen
Reefer Services, a Swedish corporation, commenced a bankruptcy proceeding in the
Stockholm City Court in the Kingdom of Sweden. 05 In accordance with Swedish law, a
trustee was appointed to oversee Salen's dealings.' 0 6 Later, Cunard Steamship com-
menced an action in the Southern District of New York against certain assets of Salen
based on an order of attachment.107 Salen then filed a motion by order to show cause
seeking to dissolve the attachment.108 After a hearing, the district court granted Salen's
motion and vacated the attachment, holding that granting comity to the Swedish court's
stay on creditor actions during the Swedish bankruptcy proceeding would further the pub-
lic policy of the United States. 10 9 Cunard then appealed the district court's decision.' 10
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Cunard argued that the district court erred by vacat-
ing the attachment because the decision was not based on the court's application of Sec-
tion 304.111 The court held that Congress had not intended Section 304 to be the
exclusive remedy to creditors)1 2 The court further determined the district court did not
abuse its discretion to vacate the attachment and grant comity to pending Swedish bank-
ruptcy proceedings." 3 In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Hilton, providing that U.S. courts should grant comity "to the decision
or judgment of a foreign court if it is shown that the foreign court is a court of competent
98. Id. at 623.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 624.
101. Id. at 627.
102. Id. at 628-29.
103. Id. at 633.







111. Id. at 459.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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jurisdiction, and that the laws and public policy of the forum state and the rights of its
residents will not be violated."1i4
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New York applied Section 304 in a
universal manner in In re Gee.Ii s There, Universal Casualty & Surety Co., a reinsurance
company domiciled in the Cayman Islands, underwent involuntary insolvency proceedings
in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands.' 1 6 The Grand Court appointed Allen Gee as
the official liquidator.1i In response to the involuntary proceeding, Universal filed a vol-
untary Chapter 11 petition in the Southern District of New York. 18 Consequently, Gee
filed a Section 304 petition in that court.'" 9 Gee's petition sought various forms of relief
including document production relating to Universal's U.S. assets, a preliminary injunc-
tion prohibiting Universal's New York directors and shareholders from disposing com-
pany records, and orders directing Universal to turnover U.S. assets to Gee. 20
At a subsequent hearing to determine the validity of Universal's Chapter 11 petition
and Gee's Section 304 requests, several arguments were made.i 21 Gee, joined by the U.S.
trustee, argued that the court should dismiss Universal's Chapter 11 petition due to the
foreign ancillary proceeding and the fact that Universal was ineligible as a Chapter 11
debtor. 122 Universal, however, contended that it filed its Chapter 11 petition in good
faith, its petition superseded Gee's Section 304 petition, Gee's Section 304 petition failed
to meet subsection (c)'s four universal factors, and Gee could not petition for relief unless
the court accorded Universal Chapter 11 relief. 123
Despite Universal's arguments, the bankruptcy court granted Gee, as the foreign repre-
sentative, relief under Section 304 and dismissed Universal's Chapter 11 petition. 124 The
court reasoned that a debtor need not have U.S. assets nor be eligible for Chapter 11 relief
in order for it to be subject to a Section 304 case, and there was no basis for concluding a
Chapter 11 petition superseded a Section 304 petition. 125 Rather, the court provided that
Gee had a right to relief for purposes of discovery because the foreign proceeding would
neither prejudice U.S. creditors nor create unjust treatment to the estate's creditors and
because, under Cayman insolvency law, distributions of the estate would be substantially
in accordance with the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 126
114. Id. at 457.
115. See In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).





121. Id. at 898-903.
122. Id. at 899.
123. Id. at 896-904.
124. Id. at 905.
125. Id. at 899-905.
126. Id. at 903-05.
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M. The Creation of a Uniform Insolvency Doctrine, the Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency, and the European Insolvency Regulation
A. THE CREATION OF A UNIFORM INSOLVENCY DOCTRINE
1. International Dilemma
While Section 304 gave bankruptcy courts authority to recognize, as well as defer to,
ancillary foreign insolvency proceedings, the statute failed to address the core problem in
international insolvencies-the absence of a unified insolvency mechanism.127 As a result,
most multinational debtors and creditors found asset distribution arising from interna-
tional insolvency proceedings to be unpredictable.] 28 Congress, however, was slow to re-
spond these concerns. 129
2. International Response
a. The World Bank
Unlike Congress, international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) became in-
creasingly involved in addressing the absence of a predictable, unified insolvency mecha-
nism.' 30 For example, in 2001, the World Bank published principles and guidelines for
effective insolvency and creditors rights systems (Principles and Guidelines)1 31 Principles
and Guidelines consisted of a collection of international "best practice" methods for insol-
vencies and creditors rights systems. 132 Its purpose was to guide reform and benchmark-
ing in developing countries. 133 Adopting a universal approach, Principles and Guidelines
emphasized contextual, integrated solutions and the policy choices involved in developing
such solutions.' 34 After publishing Principles and Guidelines, the World Bank imple-
mented its methods in a series of experimental country assessments. 135
b. IMF
In addition to the World Bank's Principles and Guidelines, the IMF published "Orderly
and Effective Insolvency Procedures" (OEIP). Similar to Principles and Guidelines,
OEIP acknowledged the importance of strengthening the global marketplace by creating a
predictable international insolvency mechanism for the benefit of both multinational
127. Biery, supra note 1, at 48.
128. Id.; see also Salafia, supra note 4, at 298-99.
129. Congress did not respond to the absence of a unified international insolvency mechanism until enacting
Chapter 15 as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act in October 2005. See
11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2005).
130. WorldBank.org, Principles & Guidelines, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNALFTOPICS/
LAWANDJUSTICE/GILD/O,,contentMDK:20196839-pagePK:64065425-piPK:162156-theSitePK:215
006,00.htnl (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. United Nations Conm'n on Int'l Trade Law, 2004-UNCITRAL Legislature Guide on Insolvency Law,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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debtors and creditors. 136 Unlike Principles and Guidelines, however, OEIP did not at-
tempt to establish particular methods.' 37 Instead, the IMF limited OEIP to major policy
choices that countries should address when designing a system, irrespective of a country's
stage in global development.138
c. UNCITRAL
At the urging of practitioners and countries like Australia and after recognizing efforts
by other IGOs, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNIC-
TRAL) began contemplating the idea of drafting a model law on international insol-
vency. 139 While national differences in approaching insolvency law and policies created a
substantial opposition to creating a model law, UNCITRAL pushed forward by establish-
ing an exploratory committee and later the Working Group on Insolvency. 14°
Over the next two years, the Working Group drafted the text of the model law at each
meeting.' 41 Representatives from thirty-six UNCITRAL member countries, forty ob-
server states, and thirteen international organizations, representing practitioners, judges,
and lenders, attended these meetings. 42 The Working Group created the model law for
international insolvencies fairly quickly, and on May 30, 1997, the Working Group
presented a finalized version of the Model Law, which UNCITRAL later endorsed. 143
B. THE MODEL LAW ON CROss-BORDER INSOLVENCY
1. Purpose
In short, the purpose of the Model Law is to assist countries in developing a modern,
harmonized, and fair framework for cross-border insolvencies. 44 It attempts to achieve
this goal by respecting the differences between national procedural laws and not address-
ing issues of substantive law. 145 Additionally, the Model Law's preamble expressly pro-
vides that it strives to promote: (1) cooperation between courts and other competent
authorities where the debtor has assets, (2) greater certainty for trade and investment, (3)
fair and efficient administration, (4) fortification and value maximization of the debtor's
assets, and (5) successful financial reorganization of troubled businesses.' 4
136. IMF.org, Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures, http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/orderly/index.
htm#foreword (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Australian Gov. Treasury, Cross-Border Insolvency and the LNCITRAL Model Law, http://www.treasury.





144. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 12
TUL. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 361, 365 (2004).
145. Jenny Clift, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency-A Legislative Framework to Facilitate
Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency, 12 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 317 (2004).
146. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 36 I.L.M. 1386, pmbl. (1997)
[hereinafter "Model Law"].
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2. Scope
The scope of the Model Law is very broad. 147 Essentially, it extends to any foreign
proceeding relating to the debtor's insolvency, where the debtor's assets and affairs are
under the jurisdiction of a foreign court. 148 The Model Law, however, applies solely to
collective creditor actions and, therefore, excludes actions brought by individual credi-
tors.' 49 Under this criteria, a variety of proceedings would be eligible for recognition,
whether compulsory or voluntary, an organization or an individual, a winding-up, or a
reorganization.'5 0
3. Content
a. Access by Foreign Representatives
A critical aim of the Model Law is to provide foreign representatives with expedited and
direct access to the insolvency proceeding in the enacting country (local proceeding).151
Therefore, it does not demand that foreign representatives employ letters rogatory or
other cumbersome and time-consuming diplomatic instruments. 5 2 Additionally, under
the Model Law, a foreign representative has procedural standing to initiate a local pro-
ceeding upon recognition of the court of the enacting country (local court).153 Thereaf-
ter, the foreign representative may participate in a local proceeding and intervene in such
proceedings concerning individual actions affecting the debtor or its assets.' 54
b. Access by Foreign Creditors
Like foreign representatives, the Model Law also allows foreign creditors access to the
local court for the purpose of initiating, or taking part in, an insolvency proceeding. 55 It
does so under the express principle that the local court should treat foreign creditors equal
to creditors of the enacting state (local creditors).S 6 Allowing foreign creditors to partici-
pate in the local proceeding takes into consideration the fact that foreign creditors have a
sincere economic interest in the outcome of the local proceeding 5 7
A foreign creditor's primary challenge in many local proceedings is receiving treatment
equal to local creditors, especially with respect to priority of claims.'58 Some laws gov-
erning insolvency grant a higher ranking to a local creditor than a foreign creditor with
147. Matthew T. Cronin, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: Procedural Approach to a Substan-
tive Problem, 24J. CORP. L. 709, 711 (1999).
148. United Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with
Guide to Enactment, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/insolvency/1997Model.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 1, 2008) [hereinafter "Cross-Border Insolvency Guide"].
149. Cronin, supra note 147, at 712.
150. Clift, supra note 145, at 319.
151. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 148, at 373.
152. Id.
153. Clift, supra note 145, at 321.
154. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 148, at 373.
155. Cronin, supra note 147, at 713.
156. See id.
157. See Clift, supra note 145, at 321.
158. Id.
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similar claims.' 59 While the Model Law requires equal treatment of foreign creditors, it
also provides that this requirement need not extend to priority of claims in insolvency
proceedings. 160 Instead, the law of the enacting state (local law) determines priority of the
foreign creditor's claims, with the stipulation that the foreign creditor deserves a mini-
mum level of treatment.161 Specifically, the local court should treat the foreign creditor at
least as well as a general unsecured creditor if a comparable local claim would receive the
same treatment.
1 62
c. Recognition of a Foreign Proceeding
The Model Law establishes requirements for the local court in determining recognition
of the foreign proceeding, stating that the local court may grant temporary relief before
recognition is determined in appropriate circumstances. 163 Under the Model Law, once a
foreign representative files an application for recognition with the local court, he or she
must provide certified documents of the decision commencing the foreign proceeding and
appointing the representative. 164 Alternatively, the foreign representative may provide
any other evidence acceptable to the court demonstrating the foreign proceeding's exis-
tence and appointing the foreign representative. 165 While the Model law recognizes the
need to translate the documents into the language of the enacting country, it does not
require the foreign representative to do so. 166 Although local law governs when notice
should be given to parties in interest, the Model Law requires the local court provide
individual notice to foreign creditors when it reaches a decision regarding recognition. 167
This additional notice obligation helps promote foreign creditor participation in the local
proceeding. 168 Notice must include the time and place for foreign creditors to file claims
in addition to whether secured creditors must file claims.' 69
By filing for recognition with the local court of the enacting state, however, the foreign
representative does not ensure that the local court will have jurisdiction over all of the
debtor's assets and affairs. 170 Instead, recognition determines whether the foreign pro-
ceeding is a foreign "main" proceeding or a foreign "non-main" proceeding. 17' Under the
Model Law, a foreign proceeding is a main proceeding if the debtor has its center of its
main interest ("COMI") in the country where the foreign proceeding is taking place. 172
The Model Law explains that the phrase COMI is assumed to be-absent evidence to the
contrary-the debtor's habitual residence or registered office in the country where the
foreign court resides.' 73
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 13(2).
162. Id.
163. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 148, at 374.
164. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 15(2)(a)-(b).
165. Id. art. 15(2)(c).
166. Clift, supra note 145, at 322.
167. Id. at 322-23.
168. Id. at 323.
169. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 14(3)(b).
170. Clift, supra note 145, at 323.
171. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 148, at 428.
172. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 16(3).
173. Clift, supra note 145, at 323.
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If, however, the foreign proceeding commenced in a country where the debtor does not
have its COMI but has an established presence, then the foreign proceeding is a foreign
non-main proceeding.174 And, if the foreign proceeding commenced in a country where
the debtor neither has its COMI nor an established presence, then it does not qualify for
recognition in the local country that has enacted the Model Law. 17
d. Relief from an Application for Recognition
With respect to relief, the purpose of the Model Law is to implement effects upon
recognition of the foreign proceeding thought necessary for expediting a fair and orderly
cross-border insolvency proceeding. 76 Because the Model Law considers certain effects
as necessary for a fair and orderly cross-border insolvency proceeding, these effects are
made standard after recognition, rather than importing the consequences of the foreign
law into the insolvency system of the exporting country.177
Although the local court must determine recognition promptly, the Model Law takes
into consideration situations where the local court may need to grant relief before deter-
mining recognition. 78 Such relief may be necessary to protect the debtor's assets or the
creditor's interests.' 79 Temporary relief may include staying an execution against the
debtor's assets, entrusting the administration or realization of the debtor's assets to the
foreign representative to protect and preserve the value of the assets, suspending the right
to transfer, encumber, or otherwise dispose of any asset of the debtor, and the examining
of a witness and the taking of evidence. 80 Notwithstanding the wide range of temporary
relief, it is unlikely that the local court will grant relief if it interferes with the foreign
proceeding's administration.' 8'
In addition to temporary relief, the Model Law also implements some standard forms of
relief that flow automatically once the local court recognizes the foreign main proceed-
ing.'8 2 These standard forms of relief include the stay of all actions concerning the
debtor's assets, rights, allegations, or liabilities, unless such action is necessary to preserve
a claim against the debtor.'8 3 Additionally, the local court will suspend the rights of per-
sons to transfer, encumber, or otherwise dispose of any the debtor's assets. 184 The local
laws governing stay and suspension, however, may supersede these effects under the
Model Law.185
Along with certain standard effects, the Model Law allows the local court to impose
discretionary forms of relief.186 Such discretionary relief is among the most frequently
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 148, at 411.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 409.
179. Id.
180. Clift, supra note 145, at 324.
181. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 19(4).
182. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 148, at 411.
183. Clift, supra note 145, at 324.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 429.
186. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 21.
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used in insolvency proceedings. 8 7 One form of relief that is afforded upon recognition is
the stay of actions or enforcement proceedings against the debtor or the debtor's assets.' 88
Another key form of relief is the suspension of the right to transfer, which freezes the flow
of money and property across borders.'89 This suspension reduces the risk of fraudulent
transfers and maximizes the likelihood that the courts can satisfy parties-in-interest (i.e.,
parties who have a recognizable stake in the debtor's insolvency proceeding). 90
Local law governs prohibitions and exclusion to the stay.191 Such exclusions may relate
to payments by the debtor in the ordinary course of business, the completion of open
market transactions, or exclusions that relate to the enforcement of secured claims.' 92
Upon the application of a foreign non-main proceeding, the local court may grant the
same temporary forms of relief that are available to a foreign main proceeding. 193 In
addition, the Model Law permits the local court to grant discretionary forms of relief.
94
Such relief may encompass appointing a person to administer all or part of the debtor's
assets, creating access to information about those assets, and any other type of relief under
local law.' 95 Relief accorded to a foreign non-main proceeding is restricted to those assets
or transactions that the local court determines have a significant connection with non-
main proceeding on the basis of the local law. 196
e. Protection of Parties-in-Interest
The Model Law also provides protection for creditors and other parties-in-interest.
197
The policy underlying this principle is that there should be a balance between relief that
courts grant to a foreign representative and the interests likely affected by such relief.'98
Under this provision, the local court must determine whether it has adequately protected
the parties' interests before it grants relief or imposes the effects of recognizing a foreign
main proceeding.199 If the local court decides an interested party is not adequately pro-
tected, it may impose other types of relief it deems appropriate, including modifying or
terminating the temporary stay or initiating avoidance actions under local insolvency
law.2 00 Furthermore, the Model Law expressly provides that a foreign representative has
standing to initiate actions to avoid or otherwise render ineffective legal acts detrimental
to creditors. 20'
187. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 148, at 469.
188. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 21(1)(a).
189. Id. art. 21(1)(c).
190. Clift, supra note 145, at 325.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 19.
194. Id.
195. Clift, supra note 145, at 326.
196. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 21(3).
197. Id. at 22.
198. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 146, at 470.
199. Id.
200. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 22(2).
201. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 148, at 472.
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f. Coordination and Cooperation
One instrumental area of the Model Law addresses coordination and cooperation. 202
This part of the Model Law enables local and foreign courts and representatives to effi-
ciently achieve optimum results.203 In addition, coordination and cooperation between
local and foreign courts and representatives maximizes asset value while minimizing litiga-
tion, expense, and delay.2 4
To ensure coordination and cooperation, the Model Law requires the local court and
local representative of the enacting country to cooperate with the foreign court and for-
eign representative "to the maximum extent possible." 205 To facilitate coordination, spe-
cifically, the Model Law authorizes direct communication, including requests for
assistance between the local court and its representative and the foreign courts and their
representatives.20 6 For purposes of cooperation, the Model Law gives the local court au-
thority to implement a wide range of tools, including: appointment of a person or body to
act at the direction of the court, communication by any appropriate means, administration
and supervision of the debtor's assets, coordination of concurrent proceedings regarding
the same debtor, and implementation of agreements regarding coordination of
proceedings. 20 7
g. Concurrent Proceedings
Finally, the Model Law recognizes the importance of coordination and cooperation
between courts when the debtor is concurrently participating in the local insolvency pro-
ceeding and one or more foreign proceedings. 208 Coordination and cooperation is partic-
ularly important in this context because fundamental differences between varying
insolvency laws can create a power struggle for control over assets and, eventually, their
mode of distribution.20 9
If the local court has recognized a foreign main proceeding, a local insolvency proceed-
ing may commence if the debtor has assets in the enacting country. 210 The local court
must usually restrict the effects of the local proceeding to the debtor's domestic assets. 2t'
But, the Model Law allows for exceptions if considered necessary to implement coopera-
tion and coordination, and distribution of the assets is permitted under local law.212 In
some situations, however, a meaningful administration of the local insolvency proceeding
may need to include specific foreign assets of the debtor, particularly when there is no
202. Clift, supra note 145, at 327.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 25(1).
206. Id. art. 25(2).
207. Id. art 27.
208. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 148, at 425.
209. Clift, supra note 145, at 328.
210. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 28.
211. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 148, at 426.
212. See Model Law, supra note 146, at 328.
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foreign proceeding in the country where these assets are situated. 213 These restrictions
are useful in preventing conflicts of jurisdiction.2 14
Under the Model Law, the commencement of a local proceeding does not prevent or
terminate the recognition of a foreign proceeding.2 15 As such, the local court of the en-
acting country may provide relief in favor of the foreign proceeding in all circum-
stances. 216 Whether the foreign proceeding is main or non-main, relief granted to the
foreign proceeding following recognition must be consistent with the local proceed-
ings. 217 Similarly, the local court will review relief that it has already granted to make sure
such relief is consistent with the local proceeding.2 18 Also, if the foreign proceeding is a
main proceeding, then the local court must modify those effects that flow automatically,
upon recognition, that are inconsistent with the foreign proceeding.219 And, if a local
proceeding is pending at the time a foreign proceeding is recognized as a main proceed-
ing, then these effects do not automatically flow to the foreign proceeding.2 20
Following recognition, the Model Law also aids in the coordination and cooperation
between two or more foreign proceedings of the same debtor and the foreign representa-
tive.221 In such cases, the local court of the enacting country has a duty to ensure coordi-
nation and uniformity between it and the foreign proceedings. 222 The Model Law helps
achieve uniformity in this regard by making sure creditors that have already received pay-
ment in the foreign proceedings do not receive additional payment until similarly situated
creditors have an equivalent distribution in the local proceeding.2 3
4. Adoption
Since UNCITRAL endorsed the Model Law, several countries have adopted legislation
based on the Model Law.2 24 These countries include the United States, Japan, Mexico,
Poland, Romania, Montenegro, Serbia, South Africa, Great Britain, and the British Virgin
Islands.225
5. Jurisprudence
Because most countries have adopted the Model Law within the past year, there is only
one case that has employed the Model Law thus far-the Xacur case. 226. In the Xacur
case, three Mexican brothers, Jacobo, Felipe, and Jose Xacur, borrowed more than $300
213. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 148, at 426.
214. Id. at 427.
215. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 29.
216. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 148, at 428.
217. Id.
218. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 29(b)(i).
219. Id. art. 29(b)(ii).
220. Id. art. 427(a)(ii).
221. Cross-Border Insolvency Guide, supra note 148, at 429.
222. Model Law, supra note 146, art. 30.
223. See id.
224. See UNCITRAL.org, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/insolvency/1997Model-sta-
tus.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
225. Id.
226. See In re Xacur, 219 B.R. 956 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1998).
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million from seven Mexican banks and one California bank to help finance their family's
business.227 By September 1996, each loan was in default. 228 Consequently, all eight
banks filed an involuntary petition in a U.S. bankruptcy court in Houston, Texas. 229
Shortly after the case was filed, the bankruptcy court commenced proceedings to deter-
mine the existence of federal court jurisdiction, the validity of the involuntary petitions,
and the appropriateness of orders for the relief.230 On appeal, the U.S. district court
found that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the Xacur brothers.231 It reasoned
that jurisdiction was proper because the brothers were residing in Houston, their place of
business was in Houston, and they held substantial amounts of property in the United
States. Thereafter, the bankruptcy court commenced liquidation proceedings against the
brothers and ultimately awarded the banks proceeds resulting from the liquidation.232
In May 2000, Mexico incorporated the Model Law into Mexican law through Chapter
12 of the Ley de Concursos Mercantiles (LCM).233 Afterwards, the Mexican Counsel to the
U.S. Trustee filed a petition in Mexican court seeking recognition and enforcement of the
U.S. bankruptcy proceedings against each brother as well as international cooperation. 234
After a complex and highly disputed process, the Mexican court entered an order,
granting the relief sought and international cooperation. 2" Following recognition, the
Mexican court granted measures to protect the estate's bankruptcy assets located in
Mexico. 236
The Xacur brothers then challenged recognition of the U.S. bankruptcy proceedings by
the Mexican court.237 But, the Mexican court confirmed its decision. Against this hold-
ing, the Xacur brothers filed another action, which was later denied because the court
found that the brothers did not suffer any constitutional harm.238 The brothers then ap-
pealed this decision to the Mexican circuit court.239
Before the circuit court could rule, Mexico's Supreme Court of Justice decided the
constitutionality of the LCM. On November 16, 2005, the Mexican Supreme Court of
Justice rendered a unanimous judgment, ruling that the Model Law does not violate the
Mexican Federal Constitution.24° After analyzing the pleadings and the merits of the case,
the Supreme Court of Justice found no legal reason to declare the Model Law unconstitu-
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not violate the sovereignty and independence of Mexico; rather, it provides a legal instru-
ment that makes an international insolvency system effective.242
The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice's decision is important for several reasons.2 43
The decision was the first case to recognize another country's insolvency proceeding
under the Model Law. 24 4 Also, the Xacur case clearly establishes that U.S. bankruptcy
courts can commence insolvency proceedings against Mexican businesses with minimum
contacts in the United States.245 Further, the case demonstrates that Mexico will enforce
a U.S. bankruptcy court's decision by gathering the debtors' Mexican assets for later dis-
tribution to foreign creditors. 246
C. THE EUROPEAN UNION INSOLVENCY REGULATION
Similar in substance to the Model Law, the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR),
officially entitled "Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency
Proceedings," became effective in May 2002.247 Completed before the Model Law, the
EIR served as the source of many of the Model Law's principle provisions.248 This part of
the paper will provide a brief overview of the EIR, discuss the principal differences be-
tween the EIR and the Model Law, and then review several cases involving the EIR that
will likely affect the way courts interpret the Model Law and Chapter 15.
1. Brief Overview of the EIR
a. Purpose
Like UNCITRAL's adoption of the Model Law, the EU adopted the EIR to facilitate
efficient and effective cross-border insolvencies. 249 The EIR does not seek to harmonize
the varying insolvency laws of the EU's Member Nations.250 Rather, it attempts to pro-
vide a universal framework within which Member Nations can interact.25s
b. Concepts
The principal concepts introduced by the EIR are: (1) the debtor's COMI, (2) the re-
buttable presumption that, for a company, its COMI is in the place of its registered office,
and (3) the distinctions between main insolvency proceedings (which can only occur in the
Member State of the insolvent entity's COMi) and secondary proceedings (which occur in
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EIR, an establishment is defined as any place of operation where the debtor carries out a
non-transitory activity with human means and goods. 253
c. Key Provisions
Article 3(1) defines the jurisdiction for main proceedings by reference to the debtor's
COMI:
The courts of the Member States within the territory of which the centre of a
debtor's main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceed-
ings.254 In the case of a company or legal person, the place of the registered office
shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the
contrary. 255
The EIR, like the Model Law, famously contains no definition of COMI, with paragraph
13 of the preamble only going as far as saying, "A 'centre of main interests' should corre-
spond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a
regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties." 256
Territorial proceedings are defined in Article 3(2):
Where the centre of a debtor's main interest is situated within the territory of a
Member State, the courts of another Member State shall have jurisdiction to open
insolvency proceedings against that debtor only if he possesses an establishment
within the territory of that Member State. The effects of those proceedings shall be
restricted to the assets of the debtor situated in the territory of the latter Member
State.2 57
Secondary proceedings are defined in Article 3(3): "Where insolvency proceedings have
been opened under paragraph 1, any proceedings opened subsequently under paragraph 2
shall be secondary proceedings. These latter proceedings must be winding-up
proceedings. 258
The applicable law in insolvency proceedings is defined by Article 4(1): "Save as other-
wise provided in this Regulation, the law applicable to insolvency proceedings and their
effects shall be that of the Member State within the territory of which such proceedings
are opened, hereafter referred to as the 'State of the opening of proceedings."' 259 But,
certain rights are excluded from this provision by Articles 5 through 15.260 These rights
include rights in rem, such as security rights of a proprietary nature, setoff rights, reserva-
tion of title rights, and contracts of employment.261
253. Id. art. 2(h).
254. Id. art. 3(1).
255. Id.
256. Id. pmbl.
257. Id. art. 3(2).
258. Id. art. 3(3).
259. Id. art 3(4).
260. Id. art. 5-15.
261. Compare id. art. 3(3), with id. art. 5-15.
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Articles 16(1) and 17(1) address uniformity and cooperation with respect to prior judg-
ments by Member States.262 Article 16(1) provides, "Any judgment opening insolvency
proceedings handed down by a court of a Member State which has jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 3 shall be recognised in all other Member States from the time that it becomes
effective in the State of the opening of proceedings." 263 Article 17(1) provides that "[t]he
judgment opening the proceedings referred to in Article 3(1) shall, with no further for-
malities, produce the same effects in any other Member State as under this law of the State
of the opening of proceedings, unless this Regulation provides otherwise." 264
Finally, paragraph 4 of the preamble discusses forum shopping.265 It states, "It is neces-
sary for the proper functioning of the internal market to avoid incentives for the parties to
transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one Member State to another, seeking to ob-
tain a more favourable legal position (forum shopping)." 266
2. Principal Differences Between the EIR and the Model Law
There are several principle differences between the EIR and the Model Law. First, the
EU has adopted the EIR as positive law.267 Second, unlike the Model Law, which is
global in its application, the EIR's application is limited to EU Member States.26 Finally,
under the EIR, when a debtor's COMI is within the EU, the EIR establishes choice-of-
law rules, rules for cooperation among the relevant courts, and jurisdictional rules.269
While the Model Law also implements rules for cooperation and jurisdiction, it does not
establish choice-of-law rules. 270 This difference can be attributed to the fact that the EIR
employs a parallel approach, which involves full parallel proceedings in both the foreign
and local courts.271 The Model Law, on the other hand, employs on an ancillary ap-
proach, which implements short proceedings in the local court for purposes of assisting
with the administration of the foreign main proceeding. 272
3. Cases Decided Under the EIR
a. ISA Daisytek SA
Several cases involving the EIR will likely affect the way courts interpret the Model Law
and Chapter 15.273 One such case is ISA Daisytek SA. In that case, the British High Court
of Leeds commenced insolvency proceedings against ISA Daisytek, a French subsidiary of
262. Id. art. 16(1), 17(1).
263. Id. art. 16(1).
264. Id. art. 17(1).
265. Id. pmbl. 4.
266. Id.
267. Westbrook, supra note 248, at 2.
268. Id. at 2.
269. Id. at 3.
270. Id. at 14, 34, 36.
271. Id. at 11-12.
272. Id.
273. Int'l Caselaw-Alert, http://www.eir-darabase.com/download/caselaw/4/nternational-Caselaw-
Alert-No-8-I-2006--January-6,-2006.pdf; see also Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles,
Sept. 4, 2003, no 03/05038, available at http://www.eir-database.com/judgements-detail.php?caseID=17.
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British parent company Daisytek-ISA Ltd.274 The British court appointed Mr. Klempka,
Mr. Taylor, and Mr. Green as administrators to the proceedings (British Administra-
tors).2 75 Later, the Commercial Court of Pontoise ordered Daisytek into administration
and appointed Maitre Valdman as administrator and Maitre Mandin as the representative
for the creditors. 276
Because the British proceedings prevented the opening of the insolvency proceedings in
France, the British Administrators applied to have the Commercial Court's judgment set
aside, but the Commercial Court denied the application.2 77 The Commercial Court rea-
soned that although the High Court commenced insolvency proceedings first, and the
United Kingdom was a Member State, the British Administrators failed to follow the EIR,
requiring the British proceeding to have jurisdiction as a main proceeding.2 78 Soon after,
the British Administrators filed an application with the Court of Appeal of Versailles to set
aside the Commercial Court's denial. 2
79
On appeal, the Court of Appeal of Versailles held that the High Court of Leeds had
properly commenced a main proceeding. 280 The court reasoned that ISA Daisytek's
COMI was in the United Kingdom. 28 In coming to this conclusion, the court paid par-
ticular attention to the fact that the German and French subsidiaries recognized the Brit-
ish proceeding as the main proceeding.28 2 Given that the main interest was in the United
Kingdom, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EIR required the Commercial Court
to recognize the British proceeding and did not have authority to commence a main pro-
ceeding with respect to the same company.
28 3
The case of ISA Daisytek SA may have significant effects on legal systems based on the
Model Law. Like the EIR, the Model Law defines the foreign main proceeding as the
proceeding that takes place in the country where the debtor's COMI is located, yet the
term "center of its main interests" is undefined in Chapter 15. Under ISA Daisytek SA,
recognition of a certain proceeding as the foreign main proceeding by parties-in-interests
evidences that the country conducting the proceeding is where the debtor's COMI is
located.
b. Co-Operation I
In Co-Operation I, a foreign representative filed several applications, requesting cross-
border cooperation and communication, with the Regional Court of Loeben in Austria.
284
The first application requested that the court dismiss the entire secondary insolvency pro-
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ceedings under Article 33 of the EIR.285 The second application requested that the court
stay the secondary proceedings for three months under Article 33. 286 But, the court de-
nied both applications, reasoning that the trustee in the main proceedings did not make
any proposals for liquidating the assets. 28 7 The third application requested that, under
Article 84, the court order the trustee in the secondary proceeding enter into a contract
with the trustee in the main proceeding to ensure coordination and cooperation in both
proceedings.288 The court, however, also denied this request as well, finding that the
trustee in the secondary proceeding already had a duty to cooperate under article 31, and a
separate court order was not necessary to impose this obligation. 289
Applying Co-Operation I to the Model Law, Co-Operation I may help to solidify coordi-
nation and cooperation in legal systems that are based on the Model Law. Much like the
EIR, the Model Law and Chapter 15 attempt to further cooperation and coordination
between courts and foreign representatives throughout its many provisions. Co-Operation
I makes clear that courts need not enter into separate contractual obligations to ensure
that courts employ these fundamental objectives.
c. Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber
Another case that will probably affect the way the Model Law and Chapter 15 are inter-
preted is Susanne Staubitz-Scbreiber.290 In that case, the debtor filed an application to
commence consumer insolvency proceedings with the local German court in Wupper-
tal.291 But, the court refused to open insolvency proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. 292
Intent on establishing jurisdiction to receive discharge in Germany, which was more
favorable than other Member States, the debtor moved to Spain and appealed the court's
decision.293 Despite ithe debtor's efforts, the German court again denied jurisdiction. 294
The debtor then appealed this decision, arguing that jurisdiction can change after filing.295
On appeal, the Federal Supreme Court ruled that a debtor cannot establish jurisdiction
after filing its application to commence insolvency proceedings. 296 In support, the court
presented three justifications for its decision. 297 First, the court pointed out that courts
should interpret Article 3 as requiring the applicant to establish jurisdiction with the court
in which the petition was filed.298 Second, the court reasoned that, because the debtor
could not have established a business within the few weeks following its move, the court
could not consider Spain the debtor's establishment.299 Finally, the court concluded that
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the time for determining the debtor's COMI is the time of filing, so as to "avoid forum
shopping."300
Susanne Staubitz-Scbreiber may have a significant effect on courts' interpretation of the
Model Law and Chapter 15. In particular, Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber demonstrates disap-
proval of debtors who move their assets for the purposes of receiving recognition and the
automatic protections that accompany a foreign main proceeding. While the case does
not expressly provide whether a debtor comes into disfavor only after filing a petition for
recognition or if there is a specific time period in which a debtor must reside in a country
before the debtor can form an establishment, Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber seems to indicate
that the test is whether the debtor moves to another country solely to obtain recognition
with the court.
d. B&C
. In B&C, the debtor, B&C, a company incorporated under Italian law, obtained a loan
from Immobiltrading, upon which B & C later defaulted. 301 Following B & C's default,
Immobiltrading filed a petition with the Tribunal of Rome to declare B & C insolvent. 30 2
In its petition, Immobiltrading argued that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to open main
proceedings over B & C under the EIR.303 Conversely, B & C contended that the Tribu-
nal did not have jurisdiction because B & C transferred its registered seat from Rome to
Luxembourg. 30 4 Immobiltrading, however, responded by arguing the transfer to another
country gave the court justification for finding the case was a matter of windup under
Italian corporate law and not insolvency, giving the court clear jurisdiction. 30 5
The Corte di Cassazione ultimately found Immobiltrading's argument persuasive, hold-
ing the case was a matter of windup, over which it had jurisdiction.3 06 In doing so, the
court relied on Article 25 of the Italian Act on Private International Law, stating that the
transfer of a registered office will result in the winding up of a company unless both
countries agree on the effects of the transfer and the continuity of the legal entity.30 7
Since the Corte di Cassazione came to this conclusion, the court's decision has undergone
much criticism for ignoring the issue of jurisdiction under the EIR and deciding the case
under Italian corporate law.308
Despite the criticism B&C has received, the case may have an impact on legal systems
based on the Model Law. Unlike Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber, the debtor in this case moved
assets in order to avoid the court's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the court established juris-
diction based on Italian corporate law while failing to address jurisdiction under the EIR.
Accordingly, parties to a foreign insolvency proceeding based on the Model Law may use
300. Id.
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B&C as precedent for the court lacking jurisdiction following a debtor's transfer of assets
to another country.
e. Eurofood
Finally, the European Court of Justice's decision in Eurofood likely provides some in-
sight as to how courts will interpret the Model Law and Chapter 15.309 In that case,
Eurofood had registered offices in Dublin, Ireland, and transacted a vast majority of its
business there. 310 Although Eurofood's parent company, Parmalat, an Italian company,
was already involved in insolvency proceedings in Italy, Eurofood filed a petition to com-
mence windup proceedings in Ireland.311 Concerned about forum shopping, the Irish
court appointed a provisional liquidator. Consequently, the Irish liquidator notified the
Italian administrator of his appointment. 312 Later, the Italian court placed Eurofood into
Italian extraordinary administration and appointed Parlamat's administrator as Eurofood's
administrator.3' 3 The Italian administrator then sought a declaration of insolvency re-
garding from the Italian court with respect to Eurofood.314 But, the Irish liquidator was
only given notice shortly before the Italian hearing and was not given a copy of the Italian
administrator's petition despite numerous requests and a contrary court order, conflicting
with the right to a fair hearing. 3' 5
Eurofood was subsequently declared insolvent, and the Italian court held that the Irish
court's appointment of the Irish liquidator did not constitute the opening of a main pro-
ceeding, Eurofood's COMI was located in Italy, and the Italian proceeding was the main
proceeding. 316 In contrast, at the windup hearing in Ireland, the Irish court refused to
recognize the Italian court's insolvency proceeding.31 7 The Irish court held that
Eurofood's COMI was located in Ireland, the appointment of the Irish liquidator opened
the main proceeding, and the Italian court should have recognized the Irish proceeding
under Article 16.318 As a result, the Irish court granted the windup order.319 The Italian
administrator subsequently appealed this decision. 320
On appeal, the European Court.of Justice concluded that the mere fact that Parmalat
bad its COMI in Italy and controlled Eurofood's economic decisions was an insufficient
basis for overcoming the presumption that Eurofood's COMI was located in Ireland,
where its registered office was located and it transacts business. 321 Additionally, the court
concluded that a Member State may refuse to recognize an insolvency proceeding opened
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by another Member State where the decision to open the proceedings was taken in fla-
grant breach of the fundamental right to be heard.322
Applying Eurofood to help determine how courts will interpret the Model Law and
Chapter 15, the case provides guidance in several respects. First, courts may presume that
a subsidiary debtor has its COMI wherever its registered office is located. Second, this
presumption may be overcome by objective factors such as the subsidiary conducting busi-
ness in another country where its parent company is located. Third, the mere fact that a
parent company is headquartered in another country is an insufficient basis for overcom-
ing the presumption that the subsidiary's COMI is located in the country where it is
registered. Finally, legal systems based on the Model Law may decide to allow enacting
countries to refuse recognition where the foreign court's decision to open the foreign
proceeding was a breach of the fundamental right to be heard.
IV. Chapter 15
Like many other countries, the United States enacted legislation based on the Model
Law, when it enacted Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code in 2005.323 By enacting legisla-
tion based on the Model Law, the United States correctly adopted an international insol-
vency mechanism favoring an ancillary approach, as opposed to the EIR's parallel system.
As such, Congress indicated a strong intent to give deference to foreign courts and foreign
law, as well as preserve U.S. judicial resources. This part of the paper will examine Con-
gress's express purpose for adopting Chapter 15, the scope of Chapter 15, and compare
Chapter 15 to its predecessor, section 304.
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
1. Purpose
Section 1501 of the Code states Congress's purpose for adopting Chapter 15. Like the
drafters of the Model Law, Congress expressly adopted Chapter 15 to: promote coopera-
tion between U.S. courts, U.S. trustees, examiners, debtors, foreign courts, and foreign
representatives; provide greater legal certainty for trade and investment; promote fair and
efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that protect parties-in-interest; pro-
tect and maximize the value of the debtor's assets; and facilitate the rescue of financially
troubled businesses, thereby protecting investment and preserving employment.324
2. Scope
Section 1501 also addresses the scope of Chapter 15. It states that Chapter 15 applies
where: (1) assistance is sought in the United States by a foreign court or a foreign repre-
sentative in connection with a foreign proceeding, (2) assistance is sought in a foreign
country in connection with a U.S. bankruptcy case, (3) a foreign proceeding and a U.S.
bankruptcy case are pending concurrently, or (4) creditors or other interested persons in a
322. Id.
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foreign country request the commencement of, or participation in, a U.S. bankruptcy
case.325
B. COMPARISON wrrH SECTION 304
1. Old Definitions
a. "Foreign proceeding"
Chapter 15 implements variations to Section 304 in several obvious respects. For exam-
ple, Congress amended the term "foreign proceeding" to mean
[A] collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign country, including an
interim proceeding, under a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt in which
proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by
a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.326
This amendment deleted the term's requirement that the foreign proceeding be in the
country of the debtor's domicile, principal place of business, or where its principal assets
are during the commencement of the proceeding. 327
b. "Foreign court"
The term "foreign court" was also amended. Now, the term "foreign court" is defined
as "a judicial or other authority competent to control or supervise a foreign proceed-
ing."328 The implications of this change are that a proceeding controlled or supervised by
a foreign official constitutes a foreign proceeding.329 It is unknown whether this change
will make a remarkable difference from the prior case law under Section 304 because the
case law recognized a foreign proceeding, regardless of whether it was controlled by a
judicial authority or foreign official. 330 Further, the revised definition includes interim
foreign proceedings, such that the local court of the enacting country may recognize that
the foreign proceedings that are commenced on an interim or provisional basis as well.331
The revised definition also includes the condition that the proceeding is "collective" (i.e.,
eliminating proceedings that are commenced for the benefit of an individual creditor).332
c. "Foreign representative"
Congress also revised the term "foreign representative." 333 The new definition states
that a "foreign representative" covers "a person or body, including a person or body ap-
pointed on an interim basis, authorized in a foreign proceeding to administer the reorgan-
ization or the liquidation of the debtor's assets or affairs or to act as a representative of
325. § 1501(b).
326. 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (2007).
327. Lee, supra note 64, at 179.
328. § 1502(3).
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such foreign proceeding." 334 The revised definition is more encompassing than the for-
mer definition but is consistent with its broad construction in section 304 hearings. 335
2. New Definitions
a. "Debtor"
Just as the 2005 amendments revised some preexisting terms, such as "foreign represen-
tative" and "foreign proceeding," the amendments also added new terms for the purpose
of Chapter 15.336 For example, Section 1502(1) defines a Chapter 15 "debtor" as "an
entity that is the subject of a foreign proceeding." 337 The prospective latitude of this
definition is dealt with in Section 1501(c), which prevents some debtors from- obtaining
Chapter 15 relief.338 Notably, Section 1501(c)(1)'s exception, in connection with Section
109(b)(3), permits a foreign bank to commence an ancillary case in the United States, even
if the bank does not have a branch or agency within the United States. 339
b. "Foreign main proceeding" and "foreign non-main proceeding"
Chapter 15 also adds the terms "foreign main proceeding" and "foreign non-main pro-
ceeding." 340 Section 1502(4) provides that a "foreign main proceeding" is a "foreign pro-
ceeding pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its main interests."341
Section 1502(5) states that a "foreign non-main proceeding" is "a foreign proceeding,
other than a foreign main proceeding, pending in a country where the debtor has an
establishment."342 Section 1502(2) defines "establishment" as "any place of operations
where the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic activity."343
Like the Model Law and the EIR, Chapter 15 does not define "center of main inter-
ests." 3 "4 But, Section 1516(c) provides that "[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the debtor's registered office, or habitual residence in the case of an individual, is pre-
sumed to be the center of the debtor's main interests." 345
c. "Center of main interests"
Since Chapter 15's enactment, the term "center of main interests" has been heavily
criticized as being too imprecise. 346 These critics contend that the term's vagueness may
give courts difficulty if, for example, a corporate debtor has its main operating facilities in
one jurisdiction, its corporate offices in a second jurisdiction, and is registered in another
334. Id.
335. Lee, supra note 64, at 180.
336. Id.
337. § 1502(1).
338. Lee, supra note 64, at 180.
339. Id.
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jurisdiction.3 47 In this situation, judges may disagree about whether evidence that the
debtor has operating facilities in one jurisdiction and corporate offices in another jurisdic-
tion is sufficient to overcome the inference in Section 1516(c) that the debtor's COMI is
located in another jurisdiction. 348 Furthermore, if evidence of the two alternative jurisdic-
tions sufficiently rebuts the inference in Section 1516(c), Chapter 15 does not expressly
provide the location of the debtor's COMI. 349 Although Chapter 15 allows for the recog-
nition of more than one foreign proceeding, and, therefore, the debtor could have ancil-
lary foreign proceedings in all three jurisdictions, Chapter 15 permits the local court to
recognize merely one of these proceedings as the foreign main proceeding. 350
3. Recognition
By intending to make recognition simple and expedient, Congress introduced a new
level of complexity to the recognition process that was not present under Section 304.351
Chapter 15 does not prohibit concurrent insolvency proceedings in more than one enact-
ing country if each country has assets of the debtor.352 Nevertheless, Chapter 15 allows
only one foreign main proceeding. 35 3 Therefore, after receiving a petition for recognition
from the foreign representative, each court must determine whether the foreign proceed-
ing is a foreign main proceeding or a foreign non-main proceeding.354
Although deciding whether a foreign proceeding is a main or non-main proceeding
seems rather clear, a closer examination reveals just the opposite. 355 Section 1504 states
that a case under Chapter 15 is "commenced by the filing of a petition for recognition of a
foreign proceeding under section 1515."356 Section 1515 requires a foreign representative
to present certain certified documents evidencing the foreign main proceeding and the
appointment of the foreign representative by the presiding foreign court.357 Nevertheless,
Section 1516(a) states that, if the filing document "indicates that the foreign proceeding is
a foreign proceeding and that the person or body is a foreign representative, the court is
entitled to so presume." 358 The legislative history explains that Congress intended for
Sections 1515 and 1516 to make recognition simple and expedient. 359
When stating its intent for Sections 1515 and 1516 to make recognition simple and
expedient, Congress failed to consider the process by which the court would need to de-
cide whether the foreign proceeding is a foreign main proceeding or a foreign non-main
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ognizes the foreign proceeding as a foreign main proceeding or a foreign non-main pro-
ceeding if "the foreign representative applying for recognition is a person or body" and
"the petition meets the requirements of section 1515."362 Furthermore, the presumption
in Section 1516(a) indicates that there is no issue of whether the proceeding meets the
definition of a foreign proceeding, under Section 101(24), when the court determines
whether the proceeding qualifies as a foreign main proceeding or a foreign non-main
proceeding.3 63 Irrespective of Congress's intent of making the recognition process easy
and expedient, Sections 1515 and 1516 may make recognition somewhat confusing and
may actually prolong the recognition process.
4. Mandatory Recognition
Unlike Section 304, Chapter 15 implements a mandatory recognition rule. 364 This
rule, found in Section 1517(a), requires that the local court recognize a foreign proceeding
if the foreign proceeding and the foreign representative meet their definitional require-
ments and the filing requirements under Section 1515.365 In addition, Section 1517's leg-
islative history provides that the local court's decision about whether to grant recognition
is independent of the court's previous analysis under Section 304(c). 366
The mandatory recognition rule is a substantial change from Section 304.367 Section
304 gave the local court of the enacting state discretionary authority to dismiss a petition
even when the proceeding constituted a foreign proceeding. 368 This is exactly what hap-
pened in In re Toga Mfg.369 There, the court denied relief to a foreign proceeding and
dismissed the petition. 370 Under Chapter 15, however, a local court may not have the
same flexibility.371 One such exception can be found in Section 1506. Section 1506 states,
"Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by
this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United
States." 372 In other words, a court may decide not to recognize a foreign proceeding if
recognition of the foreign proceeding would be contrary to U.S. public policy.373 The
legislative history restricts Section 1506, however, stating that courts should limit such
policy considerations to those considerations that are most fundamental.374
362. § 1517(a).
363. Lee, supra note 64, at 185.
364. § 1517(a).
365. Lee, supra note 64, at 185.
366. H.R. REP. No. 107-3, pt. 1,at 83 (2001) [hereinafter "HouSE REPORT"].
367. Id.
368. Lee, supra note 64, at 186.
369. See In re Toga Mfg., Ltd., 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 1983).
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5. Automatic Effects
The implications of the mandatory recognition rule come from another modification by
Chapter 15. 375 Pursuant to Chapter 15, the court's recognition of a foreign proceeding
imposes certain automatic effects. 376 Once the court recognizes a foreign proceeding as a
foreign main proceeding, under Section 1520(a), the automatic stay and adequate protec-
tion come into effect with respect to the foreign debtor. 377 Additionally, Section 363
(governing the use, sale, or lease of the debtor's property), Section 549 (allowing the trus-
tee or debtor in possession to avoid transfer of postpetition property), and Section 552
(governing the effect of security interests in postpetition property acquired by the debtor)
automatically apply to any transfer of interest in the debtor's U.S. property. 378 This is a
substantial difference from how ancillary proceedings functioned under Section 304,
which did not impose the automatic stay and gave courts discretion in granting relief.379
Notably, imposing the automatic stay, adequate protection, and other effects upon the
recognition of a foreign main proceeding brings to light another major difference between
Chapter 15 and Section 304.380 Specifically, ancillary cases under Section 304 never im-
plemented any other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.3 81 Instead, Section 304 fimc-
tioned independently. 382
Chapter 15 also increases the risk to U.S. creditors in an ancillary proceeding. 38 3 No
longer will courts rely solely on the factors codified in Section 304. 384 Because recogni-
tion is mandatory, even if the foreign proceeding does not meet Section 304(c)'s factors,
the automatic stay will apply to a foreign main proceeding immediately after recogni-
tion. 385 But, not all of the automatic effects under Chapter 15 are unfavorable to U.S.
creditors. 38 6 For example, under Section 1520(a), U.S. creditors will receive the benefit of
adequate protection in an ancillary proceeding.
38 7
Moreover, Section 1520(a) incorporates the automatic stay in an ancillary proceed-
ing.388 Most likely, the stay's incorporation created new questions for resolution because
it will operate in the framework of a foreign proceeding.3 89 The legislative history of
Section 1520(a) states that, by including the automatic stay, Section 1520(a) makes the
stay's exceptions and restrictions applicable in an ancillary case, and a bankruptcy court
has the power to terminate the stay for cause, including for a failure to provide adequate
protection.3 90 Noticeably, neither the statutory text nor the legislative history indicate
375. Id.
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377. See § 1520(a).
378. Lee, supra note 64, at 186.
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whether the court should consider Section 304(c)'s factors in determining whether there is
cause for lifting or modifying the stay. 391
But, a modified version of section 304's factors is present in Section 1507.392 Section
1507(a) states that, with limited exceptions, the court "may provide additional assistance to
a foreign representative" if recognition is granted. 393 The statute's legislative history ex-
plains that Congress intended for Section .1507 to allow the continued growth of interna-
tional cooperation under Section 304 but did not intend for the provision to be a source
for prohibiting or restricting relief.394
In examining Section 1507's legislative history, it is understandable how a court, when
determining what constitutes "for cause" under Section 1520(a), might interpret Section
1507 as precluding the court from considering Section 304(c)'s factors.395 But, this would
not be the correct interpretation of Section 1507.396 If, for example, a foreign proceeding
would discriminate against foreign creditors or subordinate a claim in a manner that vio-
lates priority under the Bankruptcy Code, a court could arguably find such action meets
the "for cause" exception under Section 362(d), considering the context of international
insolvency. 397 The legislative history uses a lack of adequate protection as an example for
lifting the stay "for cause. '398 This example, however, assumes that the foreign distribu-
tion scheme mirrors the Bankruptcy Code. 399 Consequently, courts should not construe
Section 1507's legislative history as precluding factors that might be relevant to creditor
protection and the equality of distribution among creditors. 400
Under Chapter 15, a court may also consider the breadth of the stay in a foreign pro-
ceeding when deciding whether to modify or lift the automatic stay.40 1 Chapter 15 at-
tempts to extend the effects of a U.S. bankruptcy filing to an ancillary case filing.4 2 In
drafting Chapter 15, Congress apparently realized that it is possible that the automatic
stay or other effects may be broader under the laws of the foreign country.4 3 Because
Chapter 15 requires the automatic stay be congruent to the foreign stay, secured creditors
in an ancillary U.S. proceeding may be stayed in the U.S. proceeding from collecting its
secured interest in collateral if the foreign main proceeding has already done so.40 4
Other issues will also develop regarding the scope of Section 1520. Section 1520(a)(1)
differentiates between applying Section 362 "with respect to the debtor and the property
of the debtor that is within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 4°5 Based on
this language, under Section 1520(a)(1), the stay will operate beyond U.S. borders in re-
391. Lee, supra note 64, at 187.
392. Id.
393. § 1507.
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gards to the debtor's actions.406 But, the stay is limited to operating within the United
States with regards to the debtor's property. 4 7 This construction is confirmed by Section
1520(b)'s language, stating that Section 1520(a) "does not affect the right to commence an
individual action or proceeding in a foreign country to the extent necessary to preserve a
claim against the debtor."408 Accordingly, the application of the automatic stay provisions
to an ancillary case will probably create issues that the courts have yet to consider under
the Code.409
Similar to Section 1520, several other sections of Chapter 15 govern relief in ancillary
proceedings. 410 In particular, Section 1519 gives a U.S. court authority to implement
provisional relief before the court decides whether to grant the petition for recognition if
the relief is urgently needed to protect the debtor's assets or the creditors' interests.411
Prior to Chapter 15's enactment, courts would grant such relief in Section 304 proceed-
ings by issuing a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. 412 Section 1519
provides guidance as to whether the standard requirements for injunctive relief apply to
temporary relief in an ancillary case. 413 Specifically, Section 1519 states that "[t]he stan-
dards, procedures, and limitations applicable to an injunction" apply to relief under Sec-
tion 1519.414 But, the breadth of the temporary relief may present several issues.415
While Section 1520(a) includes the automatic stay and its exceptions and limitations, Sec-
tion 1519 merely includes some exceptions and limitations of the automatic stay.416 For
example, Section 1519(d) states that, under temporary relief authority, "[a] court may not
enjoin a police or regulatory act of a governmental unit, including a criminal action or
proceeding, under this Section." 417 Section 1519() further states that the court may not
use temporary relief to stay certain setoff rights that are not subject to the automatic stay
under Section 362.418 Thus, Section 1519 might make the scope of temporary relief
broader than the automatic stay under Section 1520(a). 419
6. Discretionary Relief
Section 1521 governs the court's ability to grant discretionary relief after it recognizes a
foreign proceeding as a foreign main proceeding or a foreign non-main proceeding.420 Its
purpose is to provide the same breadth of relief that was previously available in a Section
304 proceeding. 421 Section 152 l's legislative history provides, "This section does not ex-
406. Lee, supra note 64, at 189.
407. Id.
408. § 1520(b).
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pand or reduce the scope of relief currently available in ancillary cases under sections 105
and 304 nor does it modify the sweep of sections 555 through 560."422 Subsection (a) lists
the various forms of relief the court may grant.423 Such relief includes staying the com-
mencement or continuation of actions not otherwise stayed under Section 1520(a), issuing
discovery orders, and granting additional relief available to a trustee under the Code. 424
The explicit elimination of the Bankruptcy Code's avoidance provisions corroborates that
a party-in-interest may not commence an ancillary proceeding to activate the Code's
avoidance powers or avoidance powers under foreign law.425 Section 304's jurisprudence
demonstrates that some courts presumed they could use the Code's avoidance powers in a
Section 304 proceeding, while other courts held that they could only use an avoidance
power derived from foreign law.426
7. Turnover of Property
Section 1521 governs the ultimate form of relief in an ancillary case: turnover of the
foreign debtor's property to foreign representatives. 427 Like Section 304, Section 1521
gives the local court discretion. 428 Specifically, subsection (b) states that the test for deter-
mining if the local court should turnover the debtor's property is whether the local court
believes the local creditors' interests are sufficiently protected.429
Because the test relies on the local court's decision as to whether the local creditors'
interests are sufficiently protected, courts may rely on case law, favoring a territorial ap-
proach, previously decided under Section 304.430 Section 304's factors are easily incorpo-
rated in the subsection (b)'s test for whether U.S. creditors are sufficiently protected.431
Indeed, Section 1521's legislative history explains that the statute "does not expand or
reduce the scope of relief [formerly] available in ancillary cases under [Section] 304."432
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that some courts will interpret Section 1521 to
include Section 304's jurisprudence on whether turnover relief in an ancillary proceeding
is proper. 433
8. Cooperation with Foreign Courts and Representatives
Even though Chapter 15 has replaced Section 304, Congress incorporated a modified
version of Section 304's factors into Section 1507. 434 In explaining the legislative purpose
of incorporating these factors, Section 1507's legislative history states that the factors are
useful in terms of cooperation but are not meant to be a basis for denying relief otherwise
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available. 435 Some argue that Section 1507's legislative history allows courts to incorpo-
rate case law interpreting the scope of relief under Section 304.436
Although Section 304(c)'s factors are found in Section 1507(b), and Section 1507(b)'s
legislative history states that the factors' inclusion is not intended to be the test for deny-
ing or limiting relief otherwise available, Section 1507 allows for the possibility of addi-
tional assistance to foreign proceedings beyond what is covered in Sections 1519 through
1521. 4 37 As such, the local court, in determining whether a creditor is sufficiently pro-
tected could consider these factors as the tipping point in determining whether to grant
relief.438
Section 304(c)'s factors, while not included in Section 1521 itself, are explicitly incorpo-
rated in Section 1507(b).439 Section 1507 allows for additional relief outside of Sections
1519 through 1521.440 As previously mentioned, Section 1507's legislative history states
that the statute's purpose is to further international cooperation initiated under Section
304 and not a reason for denying or limiting relief.441 Nonetheless, one should not con-
strue Section 1507 as precluding a court, in exercising its discretion, from considering a
territorial 304(c) factor that is indirectly incorporated under the factors in Section
1507(b).442
9. Comity
When incorporating Section 304(c)'s factors into Section 1507(b), Congress made a
substantial change.443 This change probably results from recommendations by academics
suggesting that the role of comity in ancillary proceedings be made clear by eliminating
comity from one of several factors and making it a determinative factor. 444 Section 1507's
legislative history explains the change as follows:
Although the case law construing section 304 makes clear that comity is the central
consideration, its physical placement as one of six factors in subsection (c) of section
304 is misleading, since those factors are essentially elements of the grounds for
granting comity. Therefore, in subsection (2) of this section, comity is raised to the
introductory language to make it clear that it is the central concept to be
addressed.445
While it is unclear what the effect of this change will have on ancillary cases, the propo-
nents of this change hope it precludes U.S. courts from taking the territorial approach like
the one in In re Toga Mfg. and In re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua S.A.446 But, the legislative
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history to Section 1507 is less specific as to the effect comity now has on similar interna-
tional insolvencies and if it is the determinative factor.447 Therefore, it is undeterminable
as to whether the change would have modified In re Toga Mfg. or In re Lineas Areas de
Nicaragua S.A. or whether the other factors still require equal consideration. 448 Because
comity is still not the determinative factor and because the other factors still require equal
consideration, it is highly unlikely that the language change will have any substantial effect
on ancillary cases. 449
But, there is one significant change to comity in Chapter 15.450 Section 1509(c) states
that "[a] request for comity or cooperation by a foreign representative in a court in the
United States other than the court which granted recognition shall be accompanied by a
certified copy of an order granting recognition under section 1517. "451 Congress adopted
this provision to prevent foreign representatives from taking a direct approach to non-
bankruptcy courts. 452 Under Section 304, and even before Section 304's enactment, non-
bankruptcy courts entertained motions from foreign representatives in search of relief
based on comity outside of Section 304 cases. 453 Now, however, bankruptcy courts will
entertain all requests for comity. 45 4
V. Conclusion
Because courts have not yet applied Chapter 15, we must look to cases decided under
the Model Law and the EIR and compare Chapter 15 to former Section 304 to determine
how U.S. courts will interpret it. Looking at the cases decided under the Model Law and
the EIR, it seems that U.S. courts will take a more universal approach in cross-border
insolvency matters under Chapter 15. While U.S. courts will confront the issue of
whether a foreign proceeding is a foreign main proceeding or a foreign non-main pro-
ceeding, several decisions applying the EIC have given U.S. courts guidance in this
respect.
Of greater concern is Congress's inclusion of Section 304(c)'s balancing test in Chapter
15 and its effect. By enacting legislation based on the Model Law, the United States
correctly adopted an international insolvency mechanism favoring an ancillary approach,
as opposed to the EIR's parallel system. As such, Congress indicated a strong intent to
give deference to foreign courts and foreign law, as well as preserve U.S. judicial re-
sources. Yet, it is very possible that the inclusion of Section 304(c)'s balancing test may
undermine Chapter 15's objective of moving toward a universal approach to cases ancil-
lary to foreign proceedings. Like Section 304, Chapter 15 implements territorial factors
for U.S. courts to rely on when deciding whether it should grant relief to a foreign repre-
sentative, which includes turnover of the debtor's U.S. domestic assets-the ultimate goal
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discretion to deny a foreign representative relief. Although one of the factors under
Chapter 15 is comity, similar to Section 304(c), there is no express indication that one
factor should be given significantly more weight than any other factor. Because Congress
included Section 304's balancing test in Chapter 15 rather than relying on the Model
Law's clear, concrete authority, the courts' application of Chapter 15 in ancillary cases
may result in an inconsistent jurisprudence.
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